Arseny Grigorievich Zverev was one of the closest associates of I.V. Stalin in the 1930s - early 1950s. He served as People's Commissar, and then Minister of Finance of the USSR and carried out the famous monetary, "Stalinist" reform in the country, did a lot for the development of the economy of the Soviet Union.
In his book, the materials of which formed the basis of this article, A.G. Zverev talks about meetings with Stalin, about how the most important issues of managing the country's finances were resolved. According to Zverev, I.V. Stalin was well versed in financial problems and pursued a highly effective economic policy, which is proved by numerous examples.
We will devote this article to Zverev himself and some of his recipes for arranging the economic life of our country.
Briefly about Zverev
Arseny Grigoryevich Zverev has come a long way. He began to work as a textile worker at the Vysokovskaya Manufactory, about this period of life in tsarist times in his book “Stalin and Money” he wrote as follows:
You work ten hours and wander, staggering from fatigue, to the hostel. In a cramped closet with a low ceiling, dirty walls and smoke-stained windows, older comrades or peers lie on hard plank beds, muttering in their sleep. Someone plays cards, someone scolds in a drunken argument. Their lives are broken, their dreams are crushed. What do they see, except for dull, exhausting and monotonous work? Who enlightens them? Who takes care of them? Pull the veins out of yourself, enrich the owners! And no one prevents you from leaving your labor in the tavern ...
A very eloquent description of the pre-revolutionary state of society, something very close to us, isn't it?
Arseny Grigorievich Zverev
After the February Revolution, Zverev moved to Moscow and actively participated in the life of the workers of the Prokhorov Trekhgornaya manufactory, where he gained his first experience in political activity. Then, when the October Socialist Revolution broke out, many plants and factories were nationalized. In 1918, Arseny Grigoryevich Zverev joined the party and asked to go to the front, but he was sent to Orenburg in 1920 to enter the cavalry school. About the most difficult days of the outbreak of civil war, he writes as follows:
The most difficult memories associated with the hungry spring of 1921. Trains full of people pass through the station every day. It is from the starving Center and the Volga region that they go to Tashkent - the “city of bread”. Some, having got out of the car for water, remain lying near the railway, not having the strength to get up from the ground. The bagmen yell. Children are crying. Here, with trembling fingers, several people are rolling cigarettes, with cabbage and nettle tops instead of tobacco, from leaflets issued by the Gubernia Health Department "On the methods of using surrogate bread." Off to the side, on fires, they burn a typhoid dress covered with lice. Kazakh families slowly wander to the embankment. They gathered near Caravanserai hoping for help. But not everyone managed to help: the city workers themselves are sitting on a meager ration.
No other political party, no other power in the world could have endured what our country experienced in the terrible years of 1921-1922. Only the Communist Party, only the Soviet power, was able to raise the state from the ruins, put people on their feet, open before them the horizons of a new life won in the days of the socialist revolution, foreign military intervention and civil war!
Since 1925, Zverev worked as the head of the Klin district financial department, in whose position he faced problems that are still relevant today:
Studying the system of regional taxation, I very quickly encountered the attempts of many private traders to hide the true size of their income and deceive the state authorities. First of all, this concerned resellers, speculators, brokers and other "intermediaries" of the trading world.
In the spring of 1930, he became the head of the Bryansk district financial department, and already in 1932 he became the head of the Bauman district financial department of Moscow, as he described his work there:
What were the everyday life of Zavraifo made up of? There was no standard. Day after day never came. A note that has survived since 1934, which I compiled as a reminder, once sitting in the office of the chairman of the district executive committee, D.S. Korotchenko, may give some idea of the individual strokes of the daily routine. He received the workers, listened to their demands, complaints, requests and wishes, and each time drew my attention to them when it came to upcoming expenses. In a few hours of the reception, I wrote down so many questions that I still wonder how we managed to do all this in a short time. I will list just a few of them. Increase the number of tram cars driving up to the factory gates; build another school in Syromyatniki; open courses for admission to the workers' faculty; pave Khludov passage; build a kitchen factory; organize a laundry at one of the factories; clean the Yauza from dirt; landscaping Olkhovskaya street; launch an additional electric train on the Nizhny Novgorod railway; open a grocery store at Chistye Prudy; introduce children's screenings at the cinema on Spartakovskaya; to open a playground on Pokrovsky Square; to supply the dormitory of the button factory with a film mover ... There were not one, but dozens of such days.
After meeting with I.V. Stalin, he refuses the offer to head the State Bank, because he did not consider himself competent enough for this job. However, from September 1937, Zverev was appointed Deputy People's Commissar for Finance of the USSR, and in January 1938 - February 1948 he became People's Commissar (from March 1946 - Minister) of Finance of the USSR.
After the war, at the direction of I.V. Stalin, Zverev developed a financial reform project and implemented it as soon as possible, which allowed the USSR, the first of the countries participating in the Second World War, to abandon the card system for distributing products and goods to the population, and then constantly reduce their prices. This continued until the death of Stalin, after which many of the achievements of the previous period were lost; was soon retired and A.G. Zverev.
The circumstances of his departure are still shrouded in mystery. Most likely, the reason for the resignation was the disagreement of A.G. Zverev with the financial policy of Khrushchev, in particular with the monetary reform of 1961.
Writer and publicist Yu.I. Mukhin writes about it this way:
In 1961 there was the first rise in prices. The day before, in 1960, the Minister of Finance A.G. was retired. Zverev. There were rumors that he tried to shoot Khrushchev, and such rumors convince that Zverev's departure was not without conflict.
Khrushchev could not decide to openly raise prices in conditions when the people clearly remembered that under Stalin prices did not rise, but fell annually. Officially, the purpose of the reform was to save a penny, they say, nothing can be bought for a penny, so the ruble must be denominated - its denomination should be reduced by 10 times.
In reality, Khrushchev carried out the denomination only in order to cover up the increase in prices. If meat cost 11 rubles, and after the price increase it should have cost 19 rubles, then this would immediately catch the eye, but if denomination is carried out at the same time, then the price of meat at 1 rub. 90 kop. at first confusing - it seems to have fallen in price. From that moment, an imbalance arose between state stores and the black market, where it became more profitable for merchants to sell goods, it was from that moment that goods from stores began to disappear.
Zverev had a conflict with Khrushchev precisely over this reform. Thus, Khrushchev (or his hands) initiated the plunder of the country, giving a signal to all corrupt officials.
In his book, Arseny Zverev tells about his life path - from a simple working guy to a minister - and proves that this was possible only in the Soviet country, where every citizen had wide prospects for realizing his best abilities.
We will give several recipes that this outstanding economist of the “Stalinist” era used in his work.
Economic recipes from Zverev
On the role of the state bank
The new principles of building the credit system also helped to turn the tide on a nationwide scale. Since 1927, the State Bank has been in charge of it from beginning to end. Branch banks have become bodies of long-term credit, and the State Bank - short-term. This division of functions, along with increased control over the use of loans, ran into an obstacle in the form of a commercial bill of exchange credit. Therefore, within two years, other forms of settlements and lending were introduced: check circulation, intrasystem settlements, direct lending without taking into account promissory notes.
How to build factories?
The ability not to spray funds is a special science. Let's say we need to build seven new enterprises in seven years. How to do better? You can build one plant annually; as soon as he enters into business, take on the next one. You can build all seven at once. Then by the end of the seventh year they will give all the products at the same time. The construction plan will be executed in both cases. What, however, will happen in another year? During this eighth year, seven factories will give seven annual production programs. If you go the first way, then one plant will have time to give seven annual programs, the second - six, the third - five, the fourth - four, the fifth - three, the sixth - two, the seventh - one program. There are 28 programs in total. Winning - 4 times. The annual profit will allow the state to take some part of it and invest it in new construction. Skillful investment is the crux of the matter. So, in 1968, each ruble invested in the economy brought the Soviet Union 15 kopecks of profit. Money spent on unfinished construction is dead and does not generate income. Moreover, they “freeze” the subsequent expenses. Suppose we invested 1 million rubles in the construction of the first year, another million rubles the next year, etc. If we build for seven years, then 7 million were temporarily frozen. That is why it is so important to accelerate the pace of construction. Time is money!
About financial reserves
The five-year plan, on the other hand, is obliged to provide for the speed of advancement of already entire parts of the national economy. It is natural that the mistakes and disproportions made in the annual plan will increase in five years and overlap each other.
This means that it is useful to have the so-called "deflection reserves". If they are present, the wind will not break the tree, it can bend, but it will stand. If they do not appear, strong roots will secure the tree only until a very strong hurricane, and then not far from the windbreak.
Consequently, it is difficult to ensure the successful fulfillment of socialist plans without financial reserves. Reserves - cash, grain, raw materials - is another permanent item on the agenda at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. And in order to optimize the national economy, we tried to use both administrative and economic methods of solving problems. We did not have computers like the current electronic computers. Therefore, they acted as follows: the governing body gave the subordinate tasks not only in the form of planned figures, but also reported prices for both production resources and products. In addition, they tried to use "feedback", controlling the balance between production and demand. Thus, the role of individual enterprises also increased.
On the research and development cycle and its financing
An unpleasant discovery for me was the fact that scientific ideas, while they were researched and developed, ate up a lot of time, and therefore money. Gradually I got used to it, but at first I only gasped: for three years we developed the design of machines; year created a prototype; for a year it was tested, reworked and “finished”: for a year they prepared technical documentation; for another year, they moved on to mastering the serial production of such machines. The total is seven years. Well, if it was a complex technological process, when semi-industrial installations were required for its development, even seven years might not be enough. Of course, simple machines were created much faster. And yet, the cycle of the full implementation of a major scientific and technical idea embraced, on average, as a rule, up to ten years. It was comforting that we overtook many foreign countries, because world practice then showed an average cycle of 12 years.
It was here that the advantage of a socialist planned economy was revealed, which made it possible to concentrate funds in the areas and directions needed by society against someone's purely personal will. By the way, there is a huge reserve of progress here: if we reduce the time for implementing ideas by several years, this will immediately give the country an increase in national income by billions of rubles.
Another way to quickly get a return on investment is to temporarily slow down some construction projects when there are too many of them. To mothball some, and at this expense to speed up the construction of other enterprises and start receiving products from them is a good solution to the problem, but, alas, also limited by specific conditions. If, for example, in 1938-1941 we had not built many large facilities at once in different parts of the country, then we would not have had the necessary production reserve after the start of the Great Patriotic War, and then the defense industry could have been in a breakthrough.
Conclusion
The main difference between Zverev and current economists was that for him people were not just another economic resource, but the main beneficiaries from the development of the entire economy. Having gone from a factory worker to the Minister of Finance of the USSR, Zverev did not lose this quality - humanity and concern for people, although he had to make difficult decisions in the interests of the state, but even then he understood that the state was created for the workers and by the forces of the workers themselves.
Our current economists, unfortunately, think more about numbers and indicators than about why they work at all and why they are called to their positions. And the result of such a policy is worthless.
In the second part of the material, we will try to evaluate the results of the most difficult case of Zverev in his high position - the monetary reform of 1947 and analyze the possibilities of using this invaluable and unprecedented experience in modern conditions.
Materials:
A.G. Zverev "Stalin and Money"
On May 4, 1935, at the graduation of the red commanders, Stalin pronounces his famous phrase: "CELLS DECIDE EVERYTHING!"
I.V. Stalin introduced this formulation into political life back in the years of the industrialization of the Soviet state. When the leader of the Soviet people minted: "Cadres decide everything", he realized that each leading team is called upon by society to solve specific tasks that the time sets. A change in the historical stage presupposes a change in the composition of the leading cadres. In the conditions of post-war peaceful construction, he did not believe that a cohort of party members with pre-revolutionary experience should make the weather in the leadership of the party and the country. On October 16, 1952, at a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Stalin said: “They ask why we dismissed prominent party and state leaders from important ministerial posts. What can be said about this? We dismissed the ministers Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and others and replaced them with new employees. Why? On what basis? The work of ministers is a peasant's work. It requires great strength, specific knowledge and health. That is why we relieved some honored comrades of their posts and appointed new, more qualified, enterprising workers in their place....
After the 19th Congress, the leading role in the leadership of the party began to be occupied by leaders who had gone through a harsh school of work in government during the Great Patriotic War and in the difficult years of the post-war restoration of the national economy. Those who did not work hard on this hellish job, and ended up in the personnel team, which I.V. Stalin bequeathed to continue socialist construction in accordance with the medium-term and long-term plans approved by the 19th Party Congress. One of them is the Minister of Finance of the USSR A.G. Zverev.
Our story is about this wonderful person and a professional with a capital letter, about one of Stalin's people's commissars, who are part of the so-called soldiers of Stalin. These were people gifted by nature not only with high intelligence, a rare ability to understand the world around them, but also with the highest sense of responsibility for their work. Possessing outstanding abilities, thoroughly knowing all the subtleties of the sphere of activity they led, they solved the problems of building a new state unknown to the world with truly outstanding results.
Finance, as you know, is one of the most powerful tools for the economic and social development of society. In finance we can sometimes find the key to understanding history. It is no coincidence that people who have comprehended the secrets of finance and financial mechanisms play an important role in the life of the state and society. And the people who headed the Ministry of Finance can write their name in the history of the state and have a significant impact on the development of the economy and finances of the country.
Arseniy Grigoryevich Zverev (1900–1969) is one of these people.
Arseny Grigorievich was born in the village of Tikhomirovo-Vysokovsky district of the Moscow region in a working class family. The family had 13 children.
Since 1912, he began his independent labor activity: he worked at textile factories in the Moscow region, from 1917 - at the Trekhgornaya manufactory in Moscow.
In 1919 he volunteered for the Red Army. In 1920–1921 was a cadet of the Orenburg cavalry school. Participated in battles against Antonov's gangs. Having been demobilized from the army, “with me“ as a keepsake, ”as Arseniy Grigorievich wrote in his memoirs,“ I carried away the wound from a bandit bullet and a military order.
In 1922–1923 A.G. Zverev worked as a senior county inspector for food procurement. The struggle for bread in these years, according to Zverev A.G., was a true front, and therefore he perceived his appointment to the food committee of the city of Klin as a combat assignment from the party.
In 1924 he was sent to Moscow to study. From this year began his activity in the financial system.
In 1930 he worked as the head of the district financial department in Bryansk.
And in 1932 he was appointed head of the Bauman district financial department of Moscow.
In 1936 he was elected chairman of the Molotovsky District Executive Committee of Moscow,
in 1937 - the first secretary of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the same region.
I.V. Stalin possessed an amazing, simply divine instinct for sensible personnel. Often he nominated people who had not yet had time to really show themselves. Former Trekhgorka worker and cavalry platoon commander Zverev is one of them. In 1937, he worked only as a secretary of one of the district committees of the party in Moscow. But he had a higher financial education and experience as a professional financier. In the conditions of a wild shortage of personnel, this was enough for Zverev to become first Deputy People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR, and after 3 months already People's Commissar.
Arseniy Grigoryevich Zverev devoted 45 years of his life to work in the financial system, of which 22 years he was the head of the country's central financial department. From 1938 to 1946 he headed the People's Commissariat of Finance, and from 1946 to 1960 - the Ministry of Finance of the USSR. He was the last People's Commissar and the first Minister of Finance of the USSR.
22 years is a whole era: from Chkalov to Gagarin. An era that could have been much harder and hungrier if not for Arseniy Zverev. This time fell on the years of the creation of socialism, the Great Patriotic War, then the restoration of the national economy and the elimination of the damage caused to our country by Nazi Germany.
Even those who did not like Zverev - and there were many of them, because he was a tough and domineering person, fully justifying his last name - were forced to recognize his exceptional professionalism.
“The financier must be firm when it comes to public funds. The party line and state laws must not be violated, even though the thunder is thundering! Financial discipline is sacred. Compliance in this matter borders on a crime.
From the very first days of his work, he did not hesitate to speak openly about shortcomings, sharply discordant with the general tone of enthusiastic Soviet patriotism. Unlike others, Zverev preferred to fight not with abstract "enemies of the peoples", but with inept directors and slow financiers.
He defended a strict austerity regime, sought to eliminate product losses, and fought against monopoly.
“The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks demanded that the employees of the People's Commissariat know the state of affairs not only in the economy, but also in the country as a whole, because at one stage or another, each event rests on its material support. The Central Committee of the Party approached questions here like a zealous host. The Party constantly sent the People's Commissariat of Finance to solve our departmental triune task: accumulation of funds - their reasonable spending - control by the ruble.(A. Zverev, "Stalin and money")
WAR AND MONEY
It was especially difficult for A.G. Zverev in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Enormous funds had to be found and immediately mobilized for defense needs. Under the leadership of Zverev, the financial system was quickly and accurately rebuilt on a military basis, and throughout the war, the front and rear were uninterruptedly provided with monetary and material resources.
During the Great Patriotic War, the country's financial system, using the possibilities of the economy and finances formed in the prewar years, directed all its efforts to the formation of resources necessary for the front, the organization of the military economy, and the production of weapons. The state actively used the possibilities of finance as the most important lever in solving defense and socio-economic tasks,
in the distribution of the costs of war among different sections of the population.
Ensuring uninterrupted financing of the defense order during the war years.
During the years of the most difficult trials, the country's financial system has not undergone fundamental, fundamental changes. State ownership of fixed assets remained unshakable in a planned economy, the main forms of financial relations, the formation of funds of funds and their use fully confirmed their viability.
The stability and consistency of all aspects of financial relations, the high flexibility of specific forms and methods of work in the conditions of firm state regulation of the economy and finance, the policy of the most severe economy in everything were reflected in the overall financial results of the war. The greatest test of the strength of our state was financed with a stable state budget: for the period 1941-1945. budget revenues amounted to 1 trillion. 117 billion rubles, expenses - 1 trillion. 146 billion rubles
Not a single belligerent state, including the United States, maintained such financial stability during the Second World War!
The superiority of Soviet aviation at the decisive stages of the war became possible largely thanks to the People's Commissar for Finance A. Zverev.
Seriously changed conditions of financial activity in the country required changes in specific forms and methods of resource mobilization. Income from the national economy has significantly decreased, and it was necessary to find new sources. During the war years, income from the national economy (tax on turnover and deductions from profits) in the state budget fell by 20% compared to 1940 (from 70% in 1940 to 50% as a result of financing the war). Taxes and various fees from the population (including state loans) have grown significantly. They rose from 12.5% in 1940 to 27% at the end of the war, and taxes on the population rose from 5.2% in 1940 to 13.2%. (In peacetime independence, our population would simply be jealous of such tax rates: 13.2%!). The year 1942 was especially difficult: the costs of meeting the needs of the war reached 59.3% of the total budget expenditures.
Judging by the indicated indicators, Ukraine has been fighting for 22 years! And stupid to the extreme.
Every war has a price in the truest sense of the word. : 2 trillion 569 billion rubles – that is exactly how much the Great Patriotic War cost the Soviet economy. The amount is huge, but accurate, verified by Stalin's financiers.
The labor feat of the Soviet people was reinforced by the timely payment of salaries and the almost uninterrupted distribution of workers' ration cards.
The largest battle in world history required equally gigantic funding, but there was nowhere to take money from. By November 1941, territories were occupied, where about 40% of the total population of the USSR lived. They accounted for 68% of iron production, 60% of aluminum, 58% of steel smelting, and 63% of coal mining.
The government had to turn on the printing press; but - not in full force, so as not to provoke an already high inflation. The number of new money put into circulation increased only 3.8 times during the war years. This, it seems, is quite a lot, although it would be useful to recall that during another war - the First World War - the emission was 5 times greater: 1800%.
Immediately after Hitler's attack, it was forbidden to withdraw more than 200 rubles a month from savings accounts. New taxes were introduced and loans stopped. Increased prices for alcohol, tobacco and perfumes. The population stopped accepting bonds of the state winning loan, at the same time a massive campaign was launched in the country to borrow funds from the population by issuing bonds of new, military loans (in total, they were issued for 72 billion rubles).
Vacations were also banned; Compensation for unused vacation went to savings books, but it was impossible to receive them until the end of the war. As a result, during all 4 years of the war, one-third of the state budget was formed at the expense of the population.
War is more than just winning battles. Without money, any, even the most heroic army, is not able to budge. Few people know, for example, that the state generously paid its soldiers for the combat initiative and did not forget to financially encourage and stimulate accomplished feats. For example, for a downed single-engine enemy aircraft, the pilot was paid a thousand bonus rubles; for a twin-engine - two thousand. The destroyed tank was estimated at 500 rubles.
The undoubted merit of the Stalinist people's commissar is that he was able to immediately transfer the economy to a military footing and preserve, keep the financial system on the edge of the abyss. “The monetary system of the USSR withstood the test of the war,” Zverev proudly wrote to Stalin.. And this is the absolute truth. Four exhausting years could have drawn the country into a financial crisis, worse even than the post-revolutionary devastation.
The name of Arseny Zverev today is known only to a narrow circle of specialists. It never sounds among the creators of victory. It's unfair. Like all good financiers, he was very stubborn and uncompromising. Zverev dared to contradict Stalin as well. The leader not only let it go, but also heatedly argued with his people's commissar and most often agreed with the arguments of the latter.
MONEY REFORM OF STALIN
But Stalin would not be himself if he did not think a few steps ahead. In 1943, when two long years remained before victory, he instructed Zverev, People's Commissar for Finance, to prepare a future post-war monetary reform. This work was carried out in the strictest secrecy, only two people fully knew about it: Stalin and Zverev.
On a December night in 1943, the telephone rang in Zverev's apartment. When the People's Commissar of Finance picked up the phone, it turned out that the person who disturbed him at such a late hour was Joseph Stalin, who had just returned to Moscow from Tehran, where a conference of the heads of the Soviet Union, the USA and Great Britain was held from November 28 to December 1. Recall that for the first time the “big three” gathered there in full force - Stalin, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. It was then that the Soviet leader made it clear to his negotiating partners that after the victories at Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, the USSR was able to deal with Nazi Germany alone. Stalin was tired of endless delays with the opening of a second front in Europe. Understanding this, the allies immediately promised that in six months the second front in Europe would finally be opened by them. Then the "Big Three" discussed some issues of the post-war order of the world.
Already from the middle of the war, Zverev began to gradually transform the financial system to the task of restoring the country's economy. Due to the austerity regime, he achieved a deficit-free budget for 1944 and 1945 and completely abandoned the emission. But all the same, by the victorious May, not only half of the country, but the entire Soviet economy of the former occupied territories lay in ruins.
It was impossible to do without a full-fledged reform; too much money has accumulated in the hands of the population; almost 74 billion rubles - 4 times more than before the war. Most of them are speculative and shadow resources illegally acquired during the war.
Nobody has been able to repeat what Zverev did either before or after: in record time, in just one week, three-quarters of the entire money supply was withdrawn from circulation. And this is without any serious upheavals and cataclysms.
PREPARATION OF MONETARY REFORM
The financial situation of the Soviet Union towards the end of World War II was difficult, and the reasons for reform were strong. First, during the war, the printing press worked hard. As a result, if on the eve of the war there were 18.4 billion rubles in circulation, then by January 1, 1946 - 73.9 billion rubles, or four times more. More money was released than was necessary for the turnover, since prices were fixed, and most of the production was distributed by cards.
At the same time, a significant part of the funds settled with speculators. It was their state that decided to rid them of what they had acquired by no means by righteous labor, but more often by criminal fishing.
It is no coincidence that later the official Soviet propaganda will present the monetary reform of 1947 as a blow to the speculators who profited in the difficult war and post-war years for the country. Secondly, along with the Reichsmarks, the ruble was in circulation in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the authorities of the Third Reich printed counterfeit Soviet rubles, which, in particular, paid salaries. After the war, these fakes needed to be urgently withdrawn from circulation.
The State Bank of the USSR was supposed to exchange cash for new rubles within a week (in remote areas of the country - two weeks). Cash was exchanged for newly issued money at the rate of 10 to 1. The population's deposits in savings banks were revalued depending on the size: up to 3,000 rubles - one to one; from 3,000 to 10,000 - three old rubles for two new ones, and over 10,000 - two to one.
Government bonds were also subject to exchange. During the war years, four loans were made. And the last one came just a few days before it ended. Historian Sergei Degtev notes: “The currency reform was accompanied by the conversion of all previous government loans into one 2 percent loan in 1948. Old bonds were exchanged for new ones in the ratio of 3 to 1. Three percent winning bonds of a freely marketable loan in 1938 were changed to a new 3% internal winning loan 1947 at a ratio of 5 to 1.
RESISTANCE TO REFORM
Despite the fact that the preparations for the reform were kept secret (Zverev himself, according to legend, even locked his own wife in the bathroom and ordered his deputies to do the same), it was not possible to completely avoid leaks.
Rumors about the coming reform have been circulating for a long time. They especially intensified in the late autumn of 1947, when information leaked from the environment of responsible party and financial officials. Numerous frauds were associated with this, when trade and catering workers, speculators, black brokers tried to legalize their capital by buying up goods and products in huge quantities.
Trying to save their cash, speculators and shadow traders rushed to buy furniture, musical instruments, hunting rifles, motorcycles, bicycles, gold, jewelry, chandeliers, carpets, clocks, and other manufactured goods. Particular resourcefulness and assertiveness in the matter of saving their savings were shown by traders and catering workers. Without agreeing, they everywhere began to massively buy up goods that were available in their outlets.
For example, if the turnover of the capital's Central Department Store on ordinary days was about 4 million rubles, then on November 28, 1947 it reached 10.8 million rubles. Food products with a long shelf life (chocolate, sweets, tea, sugar, canned food, granular and pressed caviar, salmon, smoked sausages, cheeses, butter, etc.), as well as vodka and other alcoholic beverages, were swept away from the shelves. Even in Uzbekistan, the last stocks of previously slow-moving skullcaps were swept off the shelves. Significantly increased turnover in the restaurants of large cities, where the most prosperous public walked with might and main. In the taverns the smoke stood like a yoke; nobody counted the money.
Queues began to line up in savings banks wishing to put money into a passbook. For example, on December 2, the Ministry of Internal Affairs stated “cases when depositors withdraw large deposits (30-50 thousand rubles and more), and then invest the same money in smaller deposits in other savings banks for different persons.”
However, for the most part, people survived the reform calmly; the average Soviet worker never had a lot of money, and he has long been accustomed to any trials.
REFORM RESULTS
As planned, simultaneously with the exchange of money, the card system was also canceled. Uniform state retail prices were established, and food and industrial goods went on open sale. The abolition of cards was accompanied by a decrease in prices for bread, flour, pasta, cereals and beer. At the end of December 1947, with the salaries of the majority of the urban population of 500-1000 rubles, a kilogram of rye bread cost 3 rubles, wheat - 4.4 rubles, a kilogram of buckwheat - 12 rubles, sugar - 15, butter - 64, sunflower oil - 30 , pikeperch ice cream - 12; coffee - 75; a liter of milk - 3-4 rubles; a dozen eggs - 12-16 rubles (depending on the category, of which there were three); a bottle of Zhigulevskoye beer - 7 rubles; half-liter bottle of "Moscow" vodka - 60 rubles.
Contrary to official statements, among those partially affected by the reform were not only speculators, but also the technical intelligentsia, workers of high ranks, and the peasantry. The condition of the rural inhabitants was worse than that of the urban ones. The exchange of money was carried out in the village councils and boards of collective farms. And if some of the peasants who actively speculated in food in the markets during the war had more or less serious savings, not all of them risked “lighting up” them.
The above costs of the monetary reform could not overshadow its effectiveness, which allowed the "architect" of the reform, Finance Minister Arseny Zverev, reporting to Stalin on its results, confidently declare that the population had much less hot cash in hand, and the financial situation in the Soviet Union improved. The domestic debt of the state has also been reduced.
The exchange of old rubles for new ones was carried out from December 16, 1947, within a week. Money was changed without any restrictions, at the rate of one to ten (a new ruble for the old ten); although it is clear that large sums instantly attracted the attention of people in civilian clothes. Queues lined up at the savings banks; despite the fact that the contributions were revalued quite humanely. Up to 3 thousand rubles - one to one; up to 10 thousand - with a decrease by one third; over 10 thousand - one to two.
“When carrying out the monetary reform, certain sacrifices are required,” the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks wrote in a resolution of December 14, 1947, “the state takes on most of the victims. But it is necessary that part of the victims be taken over by the population, especially since this will be the last victim.
“The successful economic and social development of the country after the monetary reform was a convincing confirmation of its timeliness, validity and expediency. As a result of the monetary reform, the consequences of the Second World War in the field of economy, finance and monetary circulation were largely eliminated, and a full-fledged ruble was restored in the country. (A. Zverev. "Stalin and money")
Simultaneously with the reform, the authorities abolished the card system and rationing; although in England, for example, cards lasted until the early 1950s. At the insistence of Zverev, prices for basic goods and products were kept at the level of rations. (Another thing is that before they had time to raise them.) As a result, products began to drop sharply in price on collective farm markets as well.
If at the end of November 1947 a kilogram of market potatoes in Moscow and Gorky cost 6 rubles, then after the reform it fell to 70 rubles and 90 rubles, respectively. In Sverdlovsk, a liter of milk used to sell for 18 rubles, now it costs 6. Beef has fallen in price by half.
By the way, the changes for the better did not end there. Every year the government lowered prices (Pavlov and Gorbachev, on the contrary, raised them). From 1947 to 1953, prices for beef fell 2.4 times, for milk - 1.3 times, for butter - 2.3 times. In general, the food basket has fallen in price by 1.75 times over this time.
Knowing all this, it is very entertaining to listen to liberal publicists today telling horrors about the post-war economy. No, life in those days, of course, did not differ in abundance and satiety. The only question is what to compare with.
And in England, and in France, and in Germany - yes, in general, in Europe - it was even harder financially. Of all the warring countries, Russia was the first to be able to restore its economy and improve the monetary system, and this is the undoubted merit of Minister Zverev, the forgotten hero of a forgotten era ...
Already by 1950, the national income of the USSR had almost doubled, and the real level of the average wage - 2.5 times, exceeding even the pre-war figures.
Having put his finances in order, Zverev proceeded to the next stage of the reform; to the strengthening of the currency. In 1950, the ruble was converted to gold; it was equated to 0.22 grams of pure gold. (A gram, therefore, cost 4 rubles 45 kopecks.)
A new rise of the Soviet people over the post-war ruins
Zverev not only strengthened the ruble, but also raised its relation to the dollar. Previously, the rate was 5 rubles 30 kopecks per US dollar; now it has become exactly four. Until the next monetary reform in 1961, this quotation remained unchanged.
Zverev also prepared for a new reform for a long time, but did not have time to implement it. In 1960, due to a serious illness, he was forced to retire, thus setting a kind of record of political longevity: 22 years in the chair of the country's chief financier.
After in 1947, the ruble and prices were stabilized, a systematic and annual reduction in prices for all goods began. The market of the USSR was becoming more and more capacious, industry and agriculture were spinning at full capacity, and continuously increasing production, and the "reversal of trade" - long chains of purchases and sales of semi-finished products - automatically increased the number of owners (economists), who, fighting to reduce the price of their goods and services, were not allowed to produce unnecessary things or goods in unnecessary quantities.
At the same time, the purchasing power of 10 rubles for food and consumer goods was 1.58 times higher than the purchasing power of the US dollar (and this is with practically free: housing, treatment, rest homes, etc.).
From 1928 to 1955 the growth of mass consumption products in the USSR was 595% per capita. In comparison with 1913, the real incomes of the working people quadrupled, and, taking into account the elimination of unemployment and the reduction in the length of the working day, by 5 times.
At the same time, in the capital countries, the level of prices for the most important foodstuffs in 1952, as a percentage of 1947 prices, increased significantly. The successes of the USSR seriously worried the capitalist countries, and primarily the United States. In the September 1953 issue of National Business magazine, in an article by Herbert Harris "The Russians are catching up with us ...", it was noted that the USSR was ahead of any country in terms of growth in economic power, and that At present, the growth rate in the USSR is 2-3 times higher than in the USA. Pay attention to the inconsistency of the headline with the content: “catching up with us” in the headline and “ahead of any country”, “growth rate is 2-3 times faster than in the USA”. Not catching up, but has long overtaken and left far behind.
US presidential candidate Stevenson assessed the situation in such a way that if the pace of production in Stalinist Russia continues, then by 1970 the volume of Russian production will be 3-4 times higher than the American one. And if this happened, the consequences for the countries of capital (and primarily for the United States) would be catastrophic.
Hearst, king of the American press, after visiting the USSR proposed and even demanded the creation of a permanent planning council in the United States.
Capital was well aware that the annual increase in the standard of living of the Soviet people is the most compelling argument in favor of the superiority of socialism over capitalism. Capital, however, was lucky: the leader of the Soviet people, Joseph Stalin, died
But during the life of Stalin, this economic situation led the Government of the USSR on March 1, 1950 to the following decision:
“In Western countries, there has been and continues to be a depreciation of currencies, which has already led to the devaluation of European currencies. As far as the United States is concerned, the continued rise in prices for consumer goods and the ongoing inflation on this basis, as repeatedly stated by responsible representatives of the US government, has also led to a significant decrease in the purchasing power of the dollar. In connection with the above circumstances, the purchasing power of the ruble has become higher than its official exchange rate. In view of this, the Soviet government recognized the need to raise the official exchange rate of the ruble, and to calculate the exchange rate of the ruble not on the basis of the dollar, as was established in July 1937, but on a more stable gold basis, in accordance with the gold content of the ruble.
Based on this, the Council of Ministers of the USSR decided:
1. From March 1, 1950, to stop determining the exchange rate of the ruble against foreign currencies on the basis of the dollar and transfer to a more stable gold basis, in accordance with the gold content of the ruble.
2. Set the gold content of the ruble to 0.222168 grams of pure gold.
3. Set from March 1, 1950, the purchase price of the State Bank for gold at 4 rubles 45 kopecks per 1 gram of pure gold.
4. From March 1, 1950, determine the exchange rate for foreign currencies based on the gold content of the ruble, established in paragraph 2:
4 rub. for one American dollar instead of the existing one - 5 rubles. 30 kopecks;
11 rub. 20 kop. for one pound sterling instead of the existing one - 14 rubles. 84 kop.
Instruct the State Bank of the USSR to change the exchange rate of the ruble in relation to other foreign currencies accordingly. In the event of further changes in the gold content of foreign currencies or changes in their rates, the State Bank of the USSR should set the ruble exchange rate in relation to foreign currencies, taking into account these changes ”(“ Pravda ”, 03/01/1950).
FIRST PERSON
Here is what A. Zverev said about some of the key moments in the formation of the Soviet financial system:
Arseniy Zverev - "Chief of the General Staff" of the most successful in the history of Stalin's monetary reform of 1947
About the reforms of the 20s and taxes,citing one instructive and typical case for world capital.
“Workers and employees with a monthly salary of up to 75 rubles, pensioners, military personnel and students were still exempt from tax. Inheritance tax, war tax, stamp duty, land rent and a number of local taxes were also levied. Within the framework of the state budget, taxes belonged to a large share at that time, which decreased from 63 percent in 1923 to 51 percent in 1925.
If we briefly generalize all these figures, giving them a socio-political characterization, then it will be necessary to say that taxes then served not only as a source of state revenues, but also as a means of strengthening the alliance of workers and peasants, a source of improving the life of the working people of town and country, stimulating the activity of state government. cooperative sector in the economy. Such was the class meaning of the financial policy of the Soviet government.
The income received was used to restore the national economy, then to the industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture. As long as our industrial base was weak, we had to resort from time to time to foreign firms and purchase machine tools, machinery and equipment from them, spending our limited reserves of foreign currency on this.More than once it happened that the capitalists, who thought about profit and hated the USSR, tried to sell us rotten and defective products. The incident with the American Liberty aircraft engines made a lot of noise. Our planes, which were equipped with engines from a batch purchased in the USA in 1924, repeatedly crashed. The analysis showed that these motors had already been previously used. From each of the motors, the inscription "Unserviceable" was scraped off and sold to us. Later, when I worked in the People's Commissariat for Finance of the USSR, I recalled this incident more than once. It is very characteristic of capitalists, especially in matters where it is a question of obtaining benefits by any means.
[Today, the Ministry of Defense purchases samples of foreign equipment not in order to massively arm them, but in order to study and use new technologies in its own defense industry. The same thing was done in the 1930s for the same purpose. During the war it was very useful.].
The new principles of building the credit system also helped to turn the tide on a nationwide scale. Since 1927, the State Bank has been in charge of it from beginning to end.(A. Zverev, "Stalin and money")
Obenefits of a planned economy
“...It is difficult to ensure the successful implementation of socialist plans without financial reserves. Reserves - cash, grain, raw materials - is another permanent item on the agenda at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. And in order to optimize the national economy, we tried to use both administrative and economic methods of solving problems. We did not have computers, like the current electronic calculating machines. Therefore, they acted as follows: the governing body gave tasks to subordinates not only in the form of planned figures, but also reported prices, for both inputs and products. In addition, they tried to use "feedback", controlling the balance between production and demand. Thus, the role of individual enterprises also increased.
An unpleasant discovery for me was the fact that scientific ideas, while they were researched and developed, ate up a lot of time, and therefore money. Gradually I got used to it, but at first I only gasped: for three years we developed the design of machines; year created a prototype; for a year it was tested, reworked and “finished”: for a year they prepared technical documentation; for another year, they moved on to mastering the serial production of such machines. The total is seven years. Well, if it was a complex technological process, when semi-industrial installations were required for its development, even seven years could not be enough. Of course, simple machines were created much faster. And yet, the cycle of complete implementation of a major scientific and technical idea took, on average, as a rule, up to ten years. It was comforting that we overtook many foreign countries, because world practice then showed an average cycle of 12 years. It was here that the advantage of a socialist planned economy was revealed, which made it possible to concentrate funds in the areas and directions needed by society against someone's purely personal will. By the way, there is a huge reserve of progress here: if we reduce the time for implementing ideas by several years, this will immediately give the country an increase in national income by billions of rubles. .
“The ability not to spray funds is a special science. Let's say we need to build seven new enterprises in seven years. How to do better? You can build one plant annually; as soon as he enters into business, take on the next one. You can build all seven at once. Then by the end of the seventh year they will give all the products at the same time. The construction plan will be executed in both cases. What, however, will happen in another year? During this eighth year, seven factories will produce seven annual production programs. If you go the first way, then one plant will have time to give seven annual programs, the second - six, the third - five, the fourth - four, the fifth - three, the sixth - two, the seventh - one program. There are 28 programs in total. Winning - 4 times. The annual profit will allow the state to take some part of it and invest it in new construction. Skillful investment is the crux of the matter. So, in 1968, each ruble invested in the economy brought the Soviet Union 15 kopecks of profit. Money spent on unfinished construction is dead and does not generate income. Moreover, they “freeze” the subsequent expenses. Suppose we invested 1 million rubles in the construction of the first year, another million rubles the next year, and so on. If we build for seven years, then 7 million will be temporarily frozen. That is why it is so important to accelerate the pace of construction. Time is money!
I know economists who, having an excellent command of the mathematical apparatus (and this is excellent!), are ready to offer you a mathematical “model of behavior” for any occasion in life. It will take into account any possible turns in the economic situation, any changes in the scale, pace and forms of economic and technical development. There is sometimes only one thing missing: a political approach.By the art of putting a task into the tape of an electronic calculating machine, summarizing for the future all conceivable and inconceivable zigzags of domestic and international development, taking into account technology, economics, politics, and the psychology of the broad masses, and the behavior of individuals standing at the helm of the state, we still , alas, did not master. We have to outline only the most probable aspect of development. But it is not identical to the mathematical model ...
As you know, the Communist Party rejected the possibility of obtaining foreign loans on extortionate terms, and the capitalists did not want to give us on "human" terms. Thus, the usual methods for the bourgeois world of creating the accumulations necessary for the reconstruction of the entire economy were not used in the USSR. The only source for creating such resources was our internal accumulations - from trade turnover, from reducing the cost of production, from the economy, from the use of the labor savings of Soviet people, etc. The Soviet state opened up various opportunities for us here, which are inherent only in the socialist system.(A. Zverev, "Stalin and money")
But with what persistence today the impotent ruling elite of independent Ukraine is trying to get more and more extortionate loans from the IMF and the World Bank; and with what stupid mediocrity he squanders them!
AT THE END OF THE GREAT ROAD
The circumstances of A. Zverev's departure from the post of Minister of Finance are still shrouded in mystery. The famous writer and publicist Yu.I. Mukhin believes that the reason for the resignation was the disagreement of A.G. Zverev with the financial policy of Khrushchev, in particular with the monetary reform of 1961.
Mukhin writes about it this way:
“In 1961 there was the first rise in prices. The day before, in 1960, Minister of Finance A.G. Zverev. There were rumors that he tried to shoot Khrushchev, and such rumors convince that Zverev's departure was not without conflict.
It is possible that the monetary reform of 1961 was at the heart of this conflict, and as we remember from the reform of 1947, such measures begin to be prepared about a year before they are carried out. Khrushchev, apparently, could not decide to openly raise prices in conditions when the people clearly remembered that under Stalin already spat on by Khrushchev, prices did not rise, but fell annually. Officially, the purpose of the reform was to save a penny, they say, nothing can be bought for a penny, so the ruble must be denominated - its face value must be increased 10 times.
Note that such a modest denomination is never carried out, for example, in 1997 the ruble was denominated 1000 times, although even beggars immediately threw out a penny from the change - in 1997 it was impossible to buy anything for 10 kopecks.
Khrushchev carried out the denomination only in order to cover up the increase in prices. If meat cost 11 rubles, and after the price increase it should have cost 19 rubles, then this would immediately catch the eye, but if denomination is carried out at the same time, then the price of meat at 1 rub. 90 kop. at first it is confusing - it seems to have fallen in price.
It is difficult to say, but it cannot be ruled out that Zverev had a conflict with Khrushchev, precisely over such a purely political, and not economic, use of finances.
A.G. Zverev was a man of action, with a firm, strong-willed character that led him through life, through the steps of the official hierarchy. At decisive moments, he was uncompromising and firmly defended his position. In his younger years, he made his life choice and remained faithful to it.
A.G. Zverev, by his principles, was a statesman, a supporter and an active participant in the creation in Soviet Russia of a centrally regulated system of the state economy, a financial system based on a centralized distribution of financial resources through the state budget.
His life's work can be called active work at all levels of the financial system, where he happened to serve to create and strengthen a system of control over the movement of financial resources. He considered finance as an instrument of state accounting and control of the economic activity of enterprises and organizations. And with his strong-willed nature, he sought to solve these problems.
A.G. Zverev left the post of Minister of Finance of the USSR in 1959 due to a stroke. After his recovery, in 1960 he went to work at the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and from October 1, 1962, he began working at the All-Union Correspondence Institute of Finance and Economics at the Department of Finance, where he worked until July 28, 1969. work at VZFEI A.G. Zverev published a number of monographs on issues of national income, finance, pricing, economic reform in the financial and credit system and other works, prepared a number of candidates of sciences and hundreds of specialists for the financial system.
“Life, profession leave their imprint on a person. Two aspects of financial activity in the foreseeable future seem to me the most important:
- how to work better;
Where is the best place to invest.
The first is an internal factor associated with some changes in the daily activities of the financial authorities. The second is external, connected with the economic foundations of the socialist economy as a whole.(A. Zverev. "Stalin and money")
These are his own words; Arseny Grigoryevich Zverev constantly lived and worked with such thoughts.
Arseny Grigorievich Zverev
Zverev Arseny Grigorievich (March 2, 1900–July 27, 1969), economist and statesman, Doctor of Economics (1959). In 1913–19, a worker at the Vysokovskaya Manufactory factory in Moscow Province. and at the Trekhgornaya manufactory in Moscow. In 1933 he graduated from the Moscow Financial and Economic Institute. In 1937, deputy People's Commissar for Finance of the USSR. In 1938–46 People's Commissar for Finance of the USSR. From 1946 to Feb. 1948 and from Dec. 1948 to 1960 Minister of Finance of the USSR. Since 1963 he has been a professor at the All-Union Correspondence Institute of Finance and Economics.
Used materials from the site Great Encyclopedia of the Russian people - http://www.rusinst.ru
Official reference
Zverev Arseniy Grigoryevich (02.19 (02.03.) 1900 - 07.27.1969), party member since 1919, member of the Central Committee in 1939-1961, candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee 10.16.52-03.06.53. Born in vil. Tikhomirovo, Vysokovsky district, Moscow region. Russian. In 1933 he graduated from the Moscow Financial and Economic Institute, Doctor of Economics (since 1959). Since 1919 in the Red Army. Since 1923 in financial work. In 1936-1937 chairman of the district executive committee, in 1937 first secretary of the district party committee in Moscow. In 1937-1938 and in February-December 1948, deputy. People's Commissar (Minister) of Finance of the USSR. From 1938 to February 1948 and from December 1948 to 1960, People's Commissar (Minister) of Finance of the USSR. Retired since 1960. Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 1-2 and 4-5 convocations. He was buried at the Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow.
The largest financier of the country
Zverev Arseniy Grigoryevich (18.2.1900, the village of Tikhomirovo, Klinsky district, Moscow province - 27.7.1969), statesman, doctor of economic sciences (1959). The son of a peasant. Educated at the Central Courses of the People's Commissariat of Finance (1925), at the Moscow Institute of Finance and Economics (1933). From 1913 he worked at a textile factory, from 1917 at the Tryokhgornaya Manufactory. In 1919 he joined the RCP(b) and the Red Army. In 1922-1924 and 1925-1929 he worked in the Klin district, an employee of the county committee of the RCP (b), sales agent, financial agent, head. department, in June - August 1929 before. executive committee of the county council. From 1932 he worked in local financial authorities. Career 3. developed in the course of mass arrests of party and economic personnel, when it became necessary to attract young specialists. In 1936 before. Molotov District Executive Committee, in 1937 1st Secretary of the Molotov District Committee of the RCP (b) (Moscow). In 1937-50 and 1954-1962 he was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. From September 1937 Deputy People's Commissar, and from 19.1.1938 People's Commissar for Finance of the USSR. In 1939-1961 he was a member of the Party Central Committee. Managed state finances during the Great Patriotic War, providing the necessary funds for the organization of military production. Under him, the issue of state internal loans was arranged, which were forcibly placed among the population (sometimes they spent most of the salary). He organized the sale at increased prices of "Narkomfin goods" (for example, white rolls and bagels), and local leaders were required to unconditionally ensure their sale in the declared volumes. On February 16, 1948, he was transferred to the post of deputy. Minister of Finance of the USSR, but already on December 28 of the same year he again headed the ministry. In October 1952 he became a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. After the death of I.V. Stalin, as the country's largest financier, retained his posts, although he lost his membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee. On May 16, 1960, he retired.
Used materials from the book: Zalessky K.A. Empire of Stalin. Biographical encyclopedic dictionary. Moscow, Veche, 2000
Read further:
Report of the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR Zverev A. G. on the state budget of the USSR for 1939 and the execution of the state budget of the USSR for 1937. May 26, 1939 (Third session of the Supreme Council. Joint meetings of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities).
Closing remarks by the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR Zverev A.G. May 28, 1939 (Third session of the Council of the Union).
Closing remarks by the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR A. G. Zverev. May 29, 1939 (Third session of the Council of Nationalities).
Compositions:
Finances of the USSR for 40 years of Soviet power//Finance and socialist construction. M., 1957;
Economic development and finance in the seven-year plan (1959–1965). M., 1959;
Problems of pricing and finance. M., 1966;
National income and finances of the USSR. 2nd ed. M., 1970.
In the November issue of "Rodina" spoke about the last Minister of Finance of the Russian Empire Pyotr Barka, whose memoirs have recently been published for the first time. Like Bark, many prominent officials of our fatherland are undeservedly forgotten. Under the heading "Servants of the Fatherland" we will remember them. And let's start with Arseny Zverev, whom experts consider the best finance minister in Russian history.
If a common monument to the creators of the Great Victory ever appears in Russia, then next to the marshals in full dress uniforms there should be a modest man in civilian clothes - People's Commissar for Finance Arseniy Zverev. Thanks to him, the monetary system of the USSR successfully survived not only the Great Patriotic War, but also the most difficult post-war years.
Nicknamed The Beast
In his memoirs Notes of the Minister, Arseniy Grigorievich emphasized with obvious pleasure two facts from his fascinating biography. First: only Jean-Baptiste Colbert, superintendent of Louis XIV - the royal finance minister - managed cash flows longer than him. Second: he climbed to the top of the career ladder from the very bottom, from the village of Negodyaevo near Moscow, which in the Soviet years was renamed Tikhomirovo for euphony.
The father of Arseniy and a dozen of his siblings worked his back at a weaving factory in the nearby town of Vysokovsk. When the boy was twelve, Zverev Sr. took him to the factory; Arseniy quickly grew to a sorter, filling the fabric base into the machines. It was a responsible job, for which 18 rubles were supposed; the boy became the main breadwinner of the family. And then my Bolshevik brother taught me: life will be better when the workers take power into their own hands. Arseniy believed this truth for the rest of his life.
Dismissed for participating in a strike, he went to Moscow, to the famous Trekhgornaya manufactory. There he met the revolution and joined the party. During the Civil War, he graduated from the cavalry school in Orenburg, chasing white Cossack gangs across the steppes. Going to bed, he put a saber and a carbine next to him: a rare night did without a combat alarm. In 1922 he was demobilized, having received a wound in the shoulder and a military order "as a keepsake".
The young communist was sent to his native Klin district to explain the policy of the party. Along the way, I had to deal with grain procurement. Zverev achieved his goal where by persuasion, and where by revolver, he could not be bribed or intimidated. Soon, the diligent worker was transferred to Moscow to the post of district financial inspector. The monetary reform revived the financial system, the depreciated "sovznaks" were replaced by gold rubles, Zverev, among others, had to fill the treasury with these rubles. He quickly became a thunderstorm for the Nepmen.
In his memoirs, Zverev proudly conveys their conversations: "It's not for nothing that they gave him such a surname - a real beast!"
In September 1937 - the black clouds of the Great Terror were already hanging over the country - he probably experienced not the most pleasant moments when he was summoned to the Kremlin late in the evening. But Stalin, whom Zverev saw for the first time, offered him the post of chairman of the State Bank. Not feeling like a specialist in the banking sector, Zverev refused. Nevertheless, the leader soon appointed Vlas Chubar as his deputy people's commissar for finance. Six months later, when he was arrested, Zverev took his place.
People's Commissar, and since 1946 he worked as a minister for 22 years, none of which was easy. But the war years were the hardest.
War and money
In June 1941, Zverev asked to go to the front - he was a reserve brigade commissar. But they demanded something else from him: to prevent the collapse of the financial system. Already in the first months, the enemy occupied the territory where 40% of the population lived and 60% of industrial products were produced. Budget revenues fell sharply, the printing press had to be turned on, but the population again became the main resource for replenishing the treasury. Already at the beginning of the war, citizens were forbidden to withdraw more than 200 rubles a month from savings accounts. Taxes rose from 5.2% to 13.2%, loans and benefits were stopped. Prices for alcohol, tobacco and those goods that were not issued on cards have risen sharply. Workers and employees were forced to voluntarily-compulsorily buy war bonds, which gave the treasury another 72 billion rubles. Getting money in any way was combined with the strictest economy.
Zverev wrote: "Each penny thrown into the wind could turn into the death of a warrior fighting at the front."
The People's Commissar and his apparatus succeeded in the impossible: the expenditures of the Soviet budget during the war years only slightly exceeded the revenues. At the same time, the money went both to restore the economy in the liberated regions (even before the end of the war, 30% of the fixed assets were restored), and for pensions for the widows and orphans who died at the front. When our troops crossed the border, expenses were added to save the inhabitants of devastated Eastern Europe from starvation (do they remember this now?). True, incomes also increased: entire enterprises were massively exported from Germany and its allied countries to the USSR.
All this complex cycle of cash flows, People's Commissar Zverev managed to control and direct. In the liberated areas, his employees first opened savings banks. And since they often had large sums with them, they never parted with weapons. Not without reason, after the war, they were dressed in green uniforms with epaulets, and the people's commissar himself rightfully received the military order of the Red Star.
Reform architect...
During the war, the amount of money in circulation quadrupled. Back in 1943, Stalin consulted with Zverev about the currency reform, but it took shape only four years later. The plan developed by the Ministry of Finance provided for the exchange of old money for new in the proportion of 10 to 1. However, deposits in savings banks were exchanged differently: up to 3,000 rubles in a ratio of 1 to 1, one third was withdrawn from deposits from 3 to 10 thousand rubles, more than 10,000 - half. Bonds of loans issued during the war years were exchanged for new ones in the ratio of 3 to 1, and pre-war bonds - 5 to 1. As a result of the accumulation of many citizens, they "shrank" greatly.
“In carrying out the monetary reform, certain sacrifices are required,” the Decree of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of December 14, 1947, said. “The state takes on most of the victims. this will be the last victim."
In preparing the reform, the main condition was strict secrecy. According to legend, on the eve of the event, Zverev himself locked his wife Ekaterina Vasilievna in the bathroom for the whole day so that she would not spill the beans to her friends. But the event was too large to be kept secret. A month earlier, trade workers and speculators closely associated with them rushed to buy goods and products. If the usual daily turnover of the Moscow Central Department Store was 4 million rubles, then on November 28, 1947 - 10.8 million. Muscovites bought up not only tea, sugar, canned food, vodka, but also such luxury items as fur coats and pianos. The same thing happened throughout the country: in Uzbekistan, the entire stock of skullcaps that had been gathering dust there had been swept off the shelves for years. Large deposits were withdrawn from the savings banks and carried back in small portions, making out to relatives. Those who were afraid to carry money to the bank skipped it in restaurants.
This was preceded by a discussion in the Central Committee - many proposed to correlate the new prices for goods with commercial ones, but Zverev insisted on maintaining them at the level of rations. Prices for bread, cereals, pasta, beer were even reduced, but meat, butter, manufactured goods became more expensive. But not for long: every year until 1953, prices were reduced, and in general, food prices fell by 1.75 times during this period. Wages remained at the same level, so the well-being of citizens as a whole has increased. Already in December 1947, with a salary of the urban population of 500-1000 rubles, a kilogram of rye bread cost 3 rubles, buckwheat - 12 rubles, sugar - 15 rubles, butter - 64 rubles, a liter of milk - 3-4 rubles, a bottle of beer - 7 rubles. , a bottle of vodka - 60 rubles.
To create an impression of abundance, goods from the "state reserves" were thrown into the market - in other words, what had previously been held back. Citizens, accustomed to empty shelves during the war years, were sincerely glad.
Of course, prosperity did not come in the country, but the main goal of the reform was achieved: the money supply decreased by more than three times, from 45.6 to 14 billion rubles. Now the strengthened currency could be transferred to a gold basis, which was done in 1950 - the ruble was equated to 0.22 grams of gold. Zverev had to become an expert in melting gold, cutting precious stones, minting coins. He often visited the Mint and the factories of Goznak, which were subordinate to the Ministry of Finance. He also took care of financial advertising, which often caused a smile (“I saved up - I bought a car”). But the success of the policy of the Ministry of Finance was proved not by advertising, but by life itself. Before the reform, the dollar was given 5 rubles 30 kopecks, and after - already four rubles (today one can only dream of such a rate).
The most surprising thing: Zverev remained himself. And he continued to argue with Stalin. When the leader ordered that additional taxes be imposed on the collective farms, he objected: "Comrade Stalin, even now many collective farmers will not even have enough cows to pay the tax." Stalin dryly said that Zverev did not know the state of affairs in the countryside, and interrupted the conversation. But the minister insisted on his own - he created a special commission in the Central Committee, convinced everyone that he was right, and ensured that the tax was not only not increased, but also reduced by a third.
... and an opponent of reform
He also argued with the new leader Nikita Khrushchev, especially when he started ill-conceived experiments in agriculture. The government considered it unreasonable to directly raise prices, so it was decided to carry out a new monetary reform under the official pretext of "saving a penny": you can't buy anything with a penny, so the ruble's denomination must be increased 10 times. As a result - the denomination of the ruble, the devaluation ...
The reform of 1961 was completed without Zverev - when he was instructed to prepare it according to the given parameters, he flatly refused. Wild rumors circulated around Moscow that he shot at Khrushchev right at the meeting of the Central Committee, after which he was sent to a special psychiatric hospital. Of course, there was no shooting, but public criticism of the leader in a harsh form could well have taken place - Arseniy Grigorievich was never shy in expressions in a dispute. In May 1960, he "of his own free will" was removed from the post of minister ...
P.S. The memoirs of Arseny Grigoryevich Zverev were published only after his death. Moreover, in a greatly abbreviated form - the author praised Stalin too actively and scolded some of his successors. The most effective, by all accounts, finance minister in our history, died in July 1969.
Soviet state and party leader, Doctor of Economics (1959). Member of the CPSU since 1919. Born into a working class family. Graduated in 1933 ... ...
Zverev Arseny Grigorievich- (1900 1969), statesman, doctor of economic sciences (1959). In 1938, 60 People's Commissar (Minister) of Finance of the USSR (in February December 1948, Deputy Minister) ... encyclopedic Dictionary
Zverev Arseny Grigorievich- (1900-1969), People's Commissar (Minister) of Finance of the USSR in 1938-60. Candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1952-53 ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary
Zverev, Arseny Grigorievich
Zverev Arseny Grigorievich- Arseny Grigorievich Zverev 5th People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR ... Wikipedia
Arseny Grigorievich Zverev- ... Wikipedia
Zverev- Zverev is a Russian surname. Notable bearers Zverev, Alexander Mikhailovich (1872 or 1870-1937) Russian religious leader (Sergiy Zverev). Zverev, Alexander Mikhailovich (b. 1960) Soviet tennis player. Zverev, Alexei ... ... Wikipedia
ZVEREV- 1. ZVEREV Anatoly Timofeevich (1931-86), painter, graphic artist. One of the leading Moscow nonconformist artists, a master of nervously expressive in the manner of writing, spontaneous in composition, marked by a special luminous coloring of portraits and ... ... Russian history
Zverev- I Zverev Arseny Grigorievich, Soviet statesman and party leader, Doctor of Economics (1959). Member of the CPSU since 1919. Born in ... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia
Zverev A. G.- ZVÉREV Arseny Grigorievich (1900–1969), People's Commissar (min.) of Finance of the USSR in 1938–60. Cand. in ch. Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1952–53 ... Biographical Dictionary
Books
- Notes of the Minister, A. G. Zverev. Arseniy Grigoryevich Zverev worked for about forty years in financial authorities. A prominent statesman went from a worker in a spinning and weaving factory to the Minister of Finance of the USSR. ... Buy for 520 rubles
- Stalin and money, Zverev Arseny Grigorievich. The author of this book (in the first edition of 1973, which had the title "Minister's Notes"), Arseniy Grigoryevich Zverev, went from a textile worker at the Vysokovskaya manufactory to a statesman ...